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Ⅰ．Introduction
Disaster management has become a hot-button issue in urban development and human security since threats from 
hazards and vulnerability are increasing, and cause the damage from natural disasters more severe, and it has 
become crucial to lower the socio-economic loss. “Disaster,” defined as a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and having an 
impact which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 
2009), and consequential “hazards,” defined as a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that 
may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihood and services, social and 
economic disruption, or environmental damage (UNISDR, 2009). In 2005, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) established a model for disaster management called Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 
according to this framework, were determined to be the baseline of disaster management, and community 
involvement towards disaster management thus became a crucial aspect of tackling threats from disasters and 
hazards in the peaceful time of the non-disaster phase. The Hyogo Framework for Action stated that approaches 
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such as increasing capacities of community members in disaster preparedness, adaptive behaviors to reducing risks, 
knowledge transfer from disaster stakeholders, and concern from the next generations are primary tasks to apply on 
the community level as Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM). To achieve successful disaster 
management on the local level, external organizations such as the government, non-profit organizations (NPOs), the 
academic sector and the private sector are encouraged to cooperate with the community and municipality in order to 
increase the capability of the community to reduce the risk and handle the damages and losses caused by disaster. 
Thailand adopted the Hyogo Framework of Action to be implemented in the case of disaster management as a 
Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP)2） for the period from 2010-2019.
The flood of 2011 in Thailand could be considered to contain unusual circumstances compared to other flooding 
cases: it caused a large amount of economic loss and the duration of flood inundation was long and affected a wide-
scale area. It also did not seem to be a flash flood, but rather developed over time from the beginning of March in the 
northern region of Thailand, becoming more severe from August until November, representing a period of 
approximately eight months of flood inundation. Due to the slow response by government and subordinate 
organizations such as municipality, divisions and departments to distribute relief aid to afflicted people, there was 
some conflict during the flood response on a community level. Moreover, the response according to the plan did not 
operate properly, with problems such as double-standard of response, communication, information management and 
intergovernmental relations occurring. Thus, the ineffectiveness of integration of flood management should be 
addressed as a core problem of flood management and flood response in that situation. There are two objectives in 
this study: (1) to summarize the current disaster management framework in Thailand; and (2) to figure out how local 
communities could respond to flood situations after the ineffectiveness of response activities operated by the 
government. There are six chapters in this paper: the first is an introduction; the second is the current disaster 
management framework in Thailand; the third is reviewing the flood situation in 2011 in Thailand; the fourth is 
feedback and criticism towards flood management; the fifth is conflict resolution; and the sixth is a conclusion.
Ⅱ．Disaster Management Framework in Thailand
Ⅱ．1 National level
The Disaster Relief Act (2007) established the Department of Disaster Protection and Management (DDPM) as a 
basic strategy to respond to any and all circumstances of a disaster situation. The DDPM’s tasks and duties comprise 
a system of responding to disaster management in a comprehensive way (mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery) by coordinating with governmental sectors, divisions and departments, local authorities, private 
organizations, and civic society within an integrative approach. The disaster policy in Thailand gained greater 
importance following the tsunami which devastated the southern region of Thailand in 2004. It drew the attention of 
the Thai government in tackling these issues, and various kinds of approaches and projects were enacted to enhance 
a sense of safety culture3） on the local level. According to the disaster management policy established by the 
Department of Disaster Management and Prevention in the year 2013, there are 7 aspects and four strategies, which 
are described in table 1:
The Strategic Committee for Water Resources Management (SCWRM) was established in order to manage flood 
response and management in Thailand after the flood situation in 2011. The Prime Minister became the chief of 
SCWRM and those with expertise in water-related issues became members of this committee. The responsibility for 
this committee was stated in the Prime Ministry’s regulation. The six main tasks which are the responsibility of 
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Table 1　Content of Disaster Department and Mitigation Plan
Core Strategy Approaches
(1) To apply the Incident Command System (ICS) as an 
operational framework 
(2) To minimize the number of traffic accidents under 
the governmental policy as national policy 
(3) To prepare the suitable operation plan of disaster 
management in accordance to the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) policy in 2015
(4) Increasing the idea of safety culture to young 
generation 
(5) To increase the preparation in local level by applying 
Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 
(6) To increase capabilities and accuracy in disaster-
related information and data
(7) To increase the capabilities of volunteer activities 
ready to be dispatched for disaster response
(1) Increase capacities of organizations with relevance to 
disaster management activities toward disaster 
prevention and relief
(2) To increase the effective integration among disaster 
response units on national level
(3) To encourage the collaboration through networking 
o f  d isaster response un i ts  for  increas ing the 
effectiveness of disaster management on local level
(4) To improve the system of victim relief to become 
more standardized
Source: Department of Disaster Protection and Management, 2013
Fig.1　Classification of Duty in National Headquarter of Disaster Management in Thailand
Source: Division of Disaster Protection and Mitigation, 2012
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Fig.2　Command system in disaster response of Thailand
Source: A. Mokkawej, 2009
Fig.3　Classification of proposal of flood management classified by basin
Source: Office of the National Water and Flood Management Policy, 2013
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SCWRM are: (1) revision of flood management policies and relevant operation plans on the national level as a 
framework in accordance with national development policy; (2) reporting the situation and the status of project 
implementation to the Thai cabinet annually; (3) coordinating with other divisions or departments to operate policies; 
(4) approving flood-management projects initiated by consultants and providing expertise to operate and implement 
SCWRM tasks; (5) approving or delegating power to committees to implement flood-management projects; and (6) 
proposing proper mitigation measurements and preparedness which are suitable to the characteristics of area.
Ⅱ．2 Regional level
According to the Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP), the contents of each strategy regarding disaster 
management activities are stated as an operation plan in terms of a year plan. Although the success of most of the 
non-structural mitigation measures such as community-based disaster risk management, establishing a risk map, 
implementing disaster drills, sharing information relevant to the disaster situation, are evaluated annually; all are 
applied as a baseline of this plan and operation. Moreover, the specifications of the disaster emergency response 
operation plan vary according to the characteristic of the hazards. 
The provincial and district level (Amphoe) are taking responsibility for the Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) 
by supervising, monitoring, and evaluating municipal activities of disaster management on the local level and 
ensuring that those subordinate organs (municipalities) are establishing proper methods of disaster management. The 
provincial and district level (Amphoe) will supervise municipalities to see their capacity for handling disaster 
situations and when their limits have been reached and also for those disaster situations which afflict multi-
jurisdictions of municipalities.
Ⅱ．3 Municipality level
(1) Municipality
According to the Thai Constitution which established in 2007, Public Administration Organizations (PAO) were 
authorized as the main organizations to support, provide, monitor and implement necessary services on its 
jurisdiction (Article 16 of Thailand Decentralization Law, 1999) and have to respond to disaster or emergency 
situations as a first-hand respondent, and support Provincial governor as a deputation (Article 20 of Disaster Relief 
Law, 2007). As they are closely related to communities, municipalities are considered a local government in Thailand 
(Section 1 Article 4 and Section 3 Article 69-71 in accordance with the Public Administration Act, 1991). Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya City are special local governments. The reasons are that both of these two 
local governments have their own legal identity, their mayors serve as city managers, and these two local 
governments are established in order to serve the rapid growth of urban development, Bangkok as a capital city, and 
Pattaya due to its rapid development as a tourist destination. To serve the local demand in their jurisdictions, those 
two areas are considered as special local governments, with the legal right to enact and implement services and 
regulations in accordance with the provision of basic services, specific demands and other tasks in its jurisdiction. 
Moreover, as stated in the single-command approach in the framework of disaster response, Local Administrative 
Organizations (municipalities, Pattaya City and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) are enabled to become first-
hand respondents towards disaster management issues. However, the changing of decision-makers or emergency 
managers is dependent on the severity of the disaster and the size of the afflicted area.
Municipalities and other agencies such as police, military, foundations and the private sector were coordinating 
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with each other and took responsibility in the event of a disaster. The Division of Disaster Prevention in 
municipalities implemented the regulation that the two major responders diagnose the damage caused by the 
disaster and provide basic relief. Fundamentally, on a legal basis, municipalities are concerned with the relief and 
mitigation of disaster threats, but in the case of the flood in 2011, the disaster proved larger than the municipalities’ 
capacity to handle it and respond to it. Thus, municipality response and relief methods were focused on flood budget 
relief in accordance with the Thai Cabinet in two ways: one was the ordinary flood relief budget, which provided for 
households that were afflicted by flooding for more than seven days; the second was a subsidy budget based on flood 
damage which was not to exceed 30,000 THB per household. Providing budget relief became the main strategy to 
give relief to victims to recover their conditions after the flood had subsided. However, the reason that budget relief 
seems to be such a big problem in municipality response is a misunderstanding from local communities, namely that 
the expectations for relief per household are larger than the limitation offered per household. This conflict of interest 
stems from the difference in cost estimation between that arrived at in self-evaluation by afflicted household and that 
determined by the evaluation of municipal officers.
(2) Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)
The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is considered a special local government system, which can be divided 
Fig.4　Executive organization in Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
Source: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2013
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into three parts, as follows: (1) Executive organs, generally coming from elections; (2) Department and divisions, which 
are classified as sixteen departments governed by the Permanent Secretariat of the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration; and (3) Sub-district office, which derived command and policy initiated by superior organs and was 
implemented as an actor. Primary objectives of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration such as maintaining public 
safety, disaster mitigation and relief, city planning, traffic management, provision of infrastructures, social welfare, 
and environmental policies are stated as tasks of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration act, 1985)
The primary flood response in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is under the purview of the Department 
of Drainage. The two threats which relate to flood risk in the BMA are, (1) Flood Prevention Plan for the BMA due 
to intensive rainfall, and (2) Flood Prevention Plan for the BMA under tidal flood risk. There are two types of flood 
measurement in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area: structural measurement and non-structural measurement. The 
implementations under these two approaches depend on the area of density. A structural measurement such as the 
polder system and embankment projects is applied in urban areas with high density of population. Non-structural 
measurement such as urban planning or canal cleaning is applied in urban areas with medium or low density of 
population. As an autonomous organization, the Bangkok Metropolitan Area had to respond to flood protection by 
itself under its legal basis and the BMA governor became an emergency manager in the case of flood situation as an 
executive organ. There are two kinds of subordinate organs which are considered operational organs: in-charge 
organs and supportive organs. The authority which is in charge of flood management in the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Area is the Department of Drainage.
According to the current situation of disaster management framework in Thailand, the inter-governmental 
relationship towards disaster management is top-down approach, and structure-oriented approach. Tasks of local 
government towards disaster management are to implement disaster mitigation and preparation projects in their 
jurisdiction. In case of disaster situation, municipalities could take response towards disaster situation based on its 
resources and capacities. Since the situation become more severe and cover larger than one jurisdiction, superior 
organs such as provincial office and central government, have to command and become the emergency manager 
towards that situation
Fig.5　Incident Command System (ICS) and on-site single command
Source: Division of Disaster Protection and Mitigation, 2012
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Ⅲ．Flood situation in Thailand in 2011
Ⅲ．1 Overview of flood situation in 2011
Thailand has experienced flooding since ancient times due primarily to the annual monsoon. Such was the case in 
the flooding of 2011. According to climate data4）, five tropical monsoons struck during the period from July 25, 2011 
to January 16, 2012, and caused flooding throughout the central region of Thailand (Fig.6). The flooding originally 
began in the northern region of Thailand in August of 2011 and become severe in September in the northern part of 
the Chao Phraya Basin, then expanded to impact a wide swath of the central region in October. The afflicted area of 
flooding covered 65 provinces with an estimated area of 90,652.43 square kilometers and claimed the lives of 815 
people to that point in time. The flood inundation from the northern region caused flooding in the central region from 
the end of July to the end of August, 2011, but the situation became more severe from September 1 to November 27. 
There are two reasons for the severity of the flooding in 2011: natural causes and man-made factors. A natural 
characteristic of the afflicted regions and the effects from global warming caused the unexpected intensity of rainfall, 
which in turn caused flood inundation in the regions. The other cause was man-made, namely self defense in flood-
prone areas, which caused isolation in flood protection, and the existing flood-management measures could handle 
only the average annual flooding (Kongchan, 2012).
According to the National Statistic Office (NSO), which collected data from February 10 to March 21, 2012, 
concerning the flood situation in 2011, the result of the survey showed that 16.9 million households were afflicted by 
flooding (80.4% of total households in 2010) and most of the afflicted households were impacted by the flood both 
inside and outside buildings. There were 17.6 million people affected by flooding (82.2% of the total population in 2010). 
Fig.6　Track of Tropical storm affecting Thailand in 2011
Source: Thai Metrological Department, 2011
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Fig.7　Approximate flooded area in Thailand 2011
Source: GISTDA, 2011
Fig.8　Flood afflicted area due to situation of flooding in 2011
Source: (a) Thailand Integrated Water Resource Management, 2012　(b) TEAM Consultant, 2011
Flood afflicted area (National) (a) Flood afflicted area (Bangkok Metropolitan Region) (b)
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In conclusion, there are 684 districts level (Amphoe) and 4,920 sub-district levels (Tambon) in 61 Provinces affected 
by flooding.
Ⅲ．2 Casualties and Economic damages
(1) Casualties
Although there were not many people killed in the flooding, this situation caused a large amount of economic 
damage, especially in the industrial sector, in the supply chain, and on the household level. According to the survey 
conducted by the National Statistic Office (NSO) in 2012 entitled Flood-Afflicted Household Survey during July–
December 2011 concerning flood-afflicted households during the period from July to December of 2011, approximately 
8.1 percent of total afflicted households experienced injuries or casualties due to the floods. Most of the health-related 
issues in the flood disaster this time related to the stress on household members, flux, conjunctivitis and rash (Table 
2).
(2) Economic damages5）
According to the National Statistic Office report entitled “Flood-Afflicted Household Survey during July–December 
2011” Data showed that during the flood of 2011, the average income in flood-afflicted households decreased in the 
post-flood period when compared to the pre-flood period (table 3). Households in Bangkok and the central region were 
more seriously effected than households in other regions, and the people in afflicted areas had to adapt from full-time 
jobs to part-time jobs. However, this data also shows that overall unemployment increased approximately one percent 
overall. In the case of damage costs, people who lived in households in Bangkok and the central region saw higher 
damage costs to assets than in other regions.
Table 2　Percentage of flood afflicted household categorized by illness and Casualties
Illness and Casualties
Region
Total Bangkok Central Northern Northeast Southern
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Nothing 91.9 93.4 88.6 93.0 93.2 94.1
Afflicted and cause illness or Casualties 8.1 6.6 11.4 7.0 6.8 5.9
Stressfulness, conjunctivitis, flux, 
Hong Kong foot and rash 7.5 4.9 10.8 6.5 6.6 5.7
Injuries 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2
Casualties 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Electric shock 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Drown 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chronic diseases 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Other cause 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Source: National Statistic Office, 2012
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Ⅲ．3 Emergency response toward flood situation in 2011
The government had applied the Incident Command System (ICS) to respond to unusual situations, especially in 
the case of disasters. The person in the role of emergency manager would change depending on the severity of 
Table 3　Percentage of household members classified by type of job (before and after flood inundation)
Aspects
Region
Total Bangkok Central Northern Northeast Southern
Before flood inundation 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Full-time job 53.0 53.3 53.5 52.8 52.4 53.0
Part-time job 7.7 4.0 5.2 10.2 10.1 6.7
Unemployed 15.0 18.6 17.4 15.2 11.0 12.7
Students 24.3 24.1 23.9 21.8 26.5 27.6
After flood inundation 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Full-time job 47.2 48.9 47.1 49.0 45.4 45.0
Part-time job 11.8 6.6 9.3 13.5 15.3 13.1
Unemployed 16.7 20.4 19.7 15.8 12.8 14.3
Students 24.3 24.1 23.9 21.7 26.5 27.6
Average household income
Before flood inundation 15,782 30,466 18,210 10,932 10,517 15,833
After flood inundation 14,095 27,188 15,801 9,818 9,646 14,994
Housing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Undamaged 52.1 50.1 50.6 56.3 45.3 69.8
Damaged 47.9 49.9 49.4 43.7 54.7 30.2
Average Damage cost (THB) 12,574 24,626 11,513 10,079 9,898 8,475
Vehicles (Cars and motorcycles) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
No asset in this type 13.5 27.8 11.4 8.8 13.5 9.1
Have this type of asset 86.5 72.2 88.6 91.2 86.5 90.9
Undamaged 62.3 55.6 68.4 63.3 56.4 68.4
Damaged 24.2 16.6 20.2 27.9 30.1 22.5
Average Damage cost (THB) 8,268 23,769 10,426 5,310 5,112 4,714
Furniture and household equipments 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
No asset in this type 5.1 5.8 3.2 4.1 7.8 5.1
Have this type of asset 94.9 94.2 96.8 95.9 92.2 94.9
 Undamaged 55.7 50.7 60.8 54.0 53.5 59.2
Damaged 39.2 43.5 36.0 41.9 38.7 35.5
Average Damage cost (HB) 5,281 12,172 5,702 3,645 2,716 2,853
Source: Source: National Statistic Office, 2012
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situation. Generally, municipalities, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, and Pattya City will take responsibility 
as primary organs towards disaster situation and use their own resources and capability. (Article 50 of Municipality 
Act 2000; Section 5 Article 89 of Bangkok Administration Act, 1985; and Section 4 Article 62 of Pattaya City 
Administration Act, 1999). In cases where the situation becomes more severe and municipalities are unable to handle 
them, the supervisory organization (e.g., on the provincial and central government levels) will supervise and command 
the response to that situation. In the case of wide-scale disaster situations, the Prime Minister will become the 
emergency manager. The structure of single command is shown in table 4 and figure 9.
According to the Disaster Relief Act of 2007, the Prime Minister has to respond as a decision maker in disaster 
situations. In order to tackle the flood disaster and give relief support to victims, the Thai government established 
the Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC) for giving basic relief to flood victims and flood-afflicted communities. 
There are 14 tasks which are relevant to flood response efforts. They are: (1) Giving relief to victims and offering 
additional response to flood relief as a one-stop service; (2) Rapidly responding and providing relief and ensuring the 
security and assets of victims; (3) Monitoring relief aid and ensuring it operates properly; (4) Providing vehicle 
support; (5) Coordinating with other divisions and departments in disaster prevention and announcing to people in a 
timely manner; (6) Establishing evacuation planning and providing temporary shelters as basic relief; (7) Monitoring 
and overseeing water discharge; (8) Having the right to establish donation centers; (9) Tracing the demands and 
attitudes of victims through various kinds of information avenues, such as hotlines, news and notifications; (10) 
Monitoring and overseeing the relief effort for victims; (11) Assigning relevant organizations to provide to FROC 
information and data which is necessary for support assessment; (12) FROC becomes the information center for 
predicting the flood situation and making announcements; (13) Giving a daily report to the Prime Minister; and (14) 
Table 4　Actors in Incident Command System
Level Description Emergency manager Operator
1
(Low level of 
severity)
Local public administrations (e.g., 
municipality, and Pattaya City) 
could handle and take response by 
their own capability 
D i s a s t e r  P r o t e c t i o n 
(Amphoe, District level) 
Execute by Sheriff
Disaster Protection (Municipality, 
T a m b o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
Organization, and Pattaya city)
2
(Moderate 
severe)
Local public administrations and 
s u b - d i s t r i c t s  i n  B a n g k o k 
Metropol itan Area could not 
handle to the situation by their 
own capability
Flood Disaster Command 
Headquarter (Provincial 
level)
Disaster Protection (Amphoe, 
District level) Execute by Sheriff 
Disaster Protection (Municipality, 
T a m b o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
Organization, and Pattaya city)
3
(High severe)
Flood disaster become more 
widespread and cause damages 
and loss, which is larger than 
provincial level could handle it 
N a t i o n a l  D i s a s t e r 
Protection Headquarter, 
Execute by Minister of 
Interior
Disaster Protection (Amphoe, 
District level) Execute by Sheriff 
Disaster Protection (Municipality, 
T a m b o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
Organization, and Pattaya city) 
F l o o d  D i s a s t e r  C o m m a n d 
Headquarter (Provincial level)
4
(Extremely 
severe)
Flood disaster becomes extremely 
severe. According to Disaster 
Relief Act in 2007, Prime Minister 
will command and make decision 
toward emergency response issues 
Prime Minister All subordinate organs
Source: Office of the National Water and Flood Management Policy, 2013
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Having the right to establish or approve working groups for supporting its operation as necessary.
Ⅲ．4 Feedback and criticism toward flood management
Since the situation became severe in October of 2011, the government established the Flood Relief Operation 
Center (FROC) prior to the flooding of Bangkok in the middle of October. A failure of communication and inaccuracy 
of information occurred, which influenced people to protect themselves using their own resources rather than rely on 
the information provided by FROC. Moreover, difference aspects of political issues among afflicted communities were 
spotted in the transparency of flood relief. The poor response and management from the government effected its 
credibility, especially in the Prime Minister and the government’s ability to provide good governance of flood 
response both in that situation and moving forward.
As a result of the failure in management in the case of the flood of 2011, the perceptions of people towards the 
government sector were at a low level. According to results of the Suan Dusit poll6）, 46.90 percent of respondents 
mentioned that the government could not handle the severe flood problems because of the poorly prepared 
management, and 24.39 percent mentioned that the government was still giving out unclear information. On the 
aspect of relief, 60.0 percent of evacuees needed compensation from the government, with 21.24 requiring 
unemployment compensation and 18.71 needing debt reliefs. In the case of non-evacuees, 24.75 percent needed the 
Fig.9　Executive units under the single command system
Source: Office of the National Water and Flood Management Policy, 2013
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government to control the price of goods and 17.57 percent needed transportation fare exception. Moreover, 
according to a survey by the Academic Network for Community Happiness Observation and Research (ANCHOR)7） 
conducted by Assumption University, which surveyed the attitude of people towards disaster response organs, the 
majority of samples show that satisfaction in the service from army forces were ranked first, advocacy groups were 
second, and media groups were third. With regard to satisfaction in the service sector, satisfaction in the medical 
hotline ranked first, followed by the railway hotline in second and emergency calls in third.
There are several things to consider as reasons for the difficulties of traditional Thai communities with relevance 
to disaster management. Factors such as unexpected occurrences, false alarms, common norms in disaster 
management, unwanted evacuations, and political perspective all caused difficulties in disaster management. However, 
there are also some advantages in the country with regard to disaster management. Social networking, an overall 
Fig.10　Summarize towards satisfaction of public in flood situation in 2011
Source: Suan Dusit Poll, 2011
Fig.11　Summarize towards satisfaction of public in flood situation in 2011
Source: ANCHOR Poll, Assumption University, 2011
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sense of charity, the effort towards capacity buildings in communities, and collaboration among public administration 
organizations are necessities in response and relief efforts in a disaster-management context. According to Tawida 
Kamolvej8), who in 2011 described current disaster management in terms of organizations, there are three 
components of disaster management. These are: (1) Organizational flexibility in legislation and regulation, operation 
manual, command and control, collaboration, information sharing, and training; (2) Technical infrastructure, including 
risk assessments, operation plans, building analysis, provision of facilities and infrastructure, technical support, and 
provision of equipment; and (3) Cultural openness9）, with common norms of disaster management, willingness to get 
involved in disaster management activities, risk acceptance, and revision of plans and operations plans.
The problem of intergovernmental relations between the central government and local government occurred in 
the flood response of 2011. The flood emergency response which was established by the central government 
deputized local government to tackle the situation as a first-hand respondent; however, the supportive instruments 
such as authority, budgets, proper communication, information management, coordination, and necessary equipment 
were not adequately provided, leading to the ineffectiveness of emergency response. As a result of brainstorming 
among Public Administration Officers, executive organs summarized the ineffectiveness of flood response. The two 
issues are: (1) The decision maker in the case of flood response is decided on the provincial level, that is to say the 
local level; and (2) Although canals became crucial players in the discharge of flood waters, their management is 
excluded from the tasks of Public Administration Organization because the Royal Irrigation Department has 
authority on water discharge. The below statements reveals some parts of the findings:
"One problem that we found towards flood response is the limit of the first-hand respondent in flood 
discharge, which is some operation, might be intrusive to other divisions, departments or other organization. 
Although central government delegate its authorities to public administrative organization to operate, but it 
not practical since the limitation stated in legal basis and might intervene to other organizations' tasks. Public 
Administration Organization in flood vulnerability provinces are not authorized to discharge flood or water 
because this operation belongs to Royal Irrigation Department (RID) or Marine Department (MD) Thus, 
Public Administration Organization could not intervene to this issue. Moreover, Public Administration 
Organization has no authorize to establish temporary shelter or taking budget for preparation for flood 
response. The reason is according to Disaster Relief Act (2007) which delegate power to Provincial governor 
for managing disaster management activities in Provincial administrative boundary, if Provincial governor 
do not declared a state of emergency, public administration organizations or municipalities could not spend, 
or ask for the budget to apply for flood response or preparation in local level." 10）
Orathai Kokphol 11)
Director of Local Government King Prajadhipok’s Institute
According to the results of a seminar entitled"Public Administration Organization towards disaster management 
strategy handled by King Prajadhipok's Institute during 13th–14th March 2012, regarding to the experiences of 
emergency management in flood situation in the year of 2011”, there were seven lessons learned, which could be 
stated as follows: (1) The flood in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region was unexpected, which reveals the ineffectiveness 
of communication and a lack of information; (2) There was a lack of supportive systems such as database, equipment, 
and alternatives to apply in Incident Command System and Single Command during the response period; (3) There is 
not any strategy for protecting the transportation network, which became more crucial for providing relief in terms 
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of logistics; (4) Flood barriers such as sandbags might not be appropriate for flood protection; since the flood barriers 
leaked, the water volume inflowed rapidly and caused severe damage out of proportion to the effectiveness of 
reducing the inflow of water volume; (5) Community involvement and individual participation became a potential 
aspect of flood management; (6) Designated evacuation shelters were afflicted by the flood, which reveals the failure 
of risk assessment; and (7) Risk communication is important, as there are five factors (the rainfall intensity on the 
upstream level, the effect of tidal flooding in coastal or riverside areas, land subsidence, the ineffectiveness of land-use 
regulation, and the ineffectiveness of flood-management systems) which stimulated the severity of flooding in the case 
of the 2011 Thai flood.
Ⅳ．Conflict resolution in flood situation
The consequences of the flood of 2011 reveal the ineffectiveness of flood management, information sharing, 
inaccuracy of information, and the difference of flood perceptions among different people and different communities, 
which leads to conflict in flood-afflicted areas. However, there are some efforts being made to resolve those conflicts 
in emergency response. According to the result of a study by the Thailand Research Fund12） involving conflict 
resolution in flood response, although some conflicts occurred, they did not go further and become violent, and 
communities and municipalities tried to collaborate with each other to minimize their deficiencies in responding to 
the flood. According to Prof. Dr. Chaiwat Sataanan, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and Assoc. 
Prof. Dr. Anuchat Puangsamlee, Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidol University, most of the cases 
of conflict in flood response come from afflicted communities that tried to claim their rights in flood-relief activities, 
and those kinds of situations influenced them to be involved in flood-response activity. The below statements reveals 
some parts of that study:
"According to the 126 cases of conflicts which proceed to riot in local level, there are approximately five 
percent which politicians had involved, other cases are communities' involvement, which show the good sign 
of collaboration, and riots did not become violence but the debating towards various kinds of flood 
management among local government, government officers and communities members had founded." 13）
Chaiwat Sataanan 14)
Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University
"Interestingly, only eight cases of 126 cases of conflict were proceeding to violence, and communities try to 
resolve their conflicts by their own, by 74% of 126 cases. This output may reveal sense of robustness among 
community members in conflict resolution, especially in flood management; or there is no any other suitable 
system or structure in flood conflict resolution.  
“According to the study finding, those affected people were deciding to gather or mob on the road for reveal 
their demand or claims, rather to apply as a political process such as parliament or governmental offices. 
Although the problems or demands of afflicted people are relating to local level, but they shown their attitudes 
towards flood management in national level as strategy of their declaration.” 15）
Anuchat Poungsomlee 16)
Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidol University
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According to this study, these four types of conflict in flood-management issues are: (1) Vulnerability aspects which 
relate to ineffectiveness of flood preparation and flood discharge or drainage; (2) Conflict during emergency response, 
such as illegally opening water gates or breaking flood barricades; (3) Conflict during the recovery process, such as 
demand of temporary shelters, demand for electricity, and demand for food; and (4) Inequality of response and relief 
provision offered by the government, causing dissatisfaction due to double standards. Precisely, 46.9 percent of the 
total cases occurred in the emergency response period, singing their names to involve themselves as groups and 
announcing via media to communicate and demand to claim their request. Moreover, the main groups which were 
blamed were first FROC, then the provincial offices, but people did not blame the municipalities. One possible reason 
is that people realize the limits of competency of municipalities, but it is possible that communities are familiar with 
municipalities themselves.
Regardless of the method of declaration, more than 58.7 percent of cases were resolved in negotiation through a 
self-help approach and did not proceed further to conflict. Confrontation can easily come about to cause further 
conflict. The residential districts which are located in Bangkok and Pathumtani Provinces were potential sites of 
conflict from flood management, and the protective measures (flood barriers, sandbags, or water gate control) 
especially were potential causes for further conflict and riot. These conflicts and claims also reveal the gaps among 
governmental sectors, especially the intergovernmental relationship between the central government and the local 
government, and between executive organs and operational organs. Thus, the effort which was initiated by the 
government should operate with equity and unity, and the flood management mechanisms are necessities, 
strengthening the inter-governmental relations in order to reduce gaps between the central government and the local 
government. Negotiation among stakeholders is also necessary in flood management in the future.
The collaboration among flood disaster stakeholders during the flooding of 2011 found, not only communities and 
municipalities as first-hand respondents, but also academic and research institutions taking part in conflict resolution 
by trying to figure out how to minimize conflicts in flood response. However, this study applied two case studies of 
the flood situation: Pak Kret Municipality, Nonthaburi Province, and Samut Sakorn Municipality. Online information 
such as media, newspapers, information provided by municipalities, and discussion from experts are applied as 
secondary data sources in this paper.
Ⅳ．1 Pak Kret Municipality, Nonthaburi Province, Thailand
Pak Kret Municipality is located in Amphoe Mueng Park Kret, Nonthaburi Province. Pak Kret Municipality is 
bordered on the west by the Chao Phraya River. The jurisdiction of Pak Kret Municipality is about 36.04 square 
kilometers, which covers five districts and 34 villages (fig.12). This area is in the flatlands of the Chao Phraya River 
Basin and has the potential for planned cultivation, but nowadays Pak Kret Municipality has become a residential 
area for commuters who are working in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.
Pak Kret Municipality was considered to have a high level of flood risk and it was estimated that the area might 
see flooding of at least 1.50 meters in height due to flood in 2011, but it was not flooded in that time. Vichai Bandasak, 
Mayor of Pak Kret Municipality, explained that in terms of flood protection in Pak Kret Municipality in 2011, basic 
protective measures such as building soil dykes and stacking sandbags were implemented as a baseline of protection 
to guard against threats from river flooding alongside the Chao Phraya River. Additional measures, such as around-
the-clock maintenance of those barricades, are necessary, especially with the danger of leakage in the flood barriers. 
Moreover, with regard to flood barricade systems, Pak Kret Municipality built two lines of barricades to protect 
against the leakage of water. Communities also made efforts to collaborate with the municipality in flood protection.
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Since Pak Kret Municipality was flooded in 1995, various kinds of structural measurements such as dyke systems 
and pumping stations were constructed to mitigate and prepare for potential unusual situations. In cases of conflict 
between stakeholders, the municipalities had to ask monks to negotiate with communities to minimize conflicts. 
However, in the case of communities which were afflicted by the flood, there were various kinds of relief provided by 
municipalities such as relief bags or bridges built for access to flood-afflicted areas.
Phra Padungsak Kositthammo, abbatial abbot of Wat Salak Nua temple, explained the protection effort during the 
flooding of 2011. When this temple was informed of the flooding situation, they asked for soil and sand to make flood 
barricades. Monks, community members, and laborers from Myanmar and Cambodia were called on to help make 
sandbags and set up flood barricades to block water. At the time of high tides, monks helped municipal officers to 
monitor the pumping machine in daytime, while community members monitored the machines during the night, and 
schools cooked foods to provide sustenance to volunteers. The statement below shows the important of monks in 
conflict resolution in the case of flooding:
"I asked communities member like 'If flood barricade are leak and might cause a flood in this area, what 
should we do?' the resolution comes up with the temple and community will dedicate to become flood to 
protect business and commercial area, and ask municipality to apply Tiwanon Road as a third-line flood 
barricade. This circumstance is impossible if communities try to resolve by themselves, but monk can do, 
because of the traditional and respects from people." 17）
Fig.12　Location of Pak Kret Municipality, Nonthaburi Province
Source: Google Earth, 2013
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Phra Padungsak Kositthammo,
Abbatial abbot of Wat Salak Nua temple
Ⅳ．2 Samut Sakorn Municipality, Samut Sakorn Province, Thailand
Amphoe Mueng, Samut Sakorn is located in Samut Sakorn Province, which is bordered on the south by the Thai 
Gulf. Like Pak Kret Municipality, Samut Sakorn Municipality is connected to a major river, the Tha Chin River. The 
area of Samut Sakorn Municipality, Amphoe Mueng, Samut Sakorn is about 10.33 square kilometers (fig.13) and it is 
located in the flatlands of the Chao Phraya River Basin with potential for planned cultivation. In the case of the flood 
situation of 2011, this area was proposed as the last area of flood drainage in the Chao Phraya and Tha Chin River 
Basins. Samut Sakorn is dependent on geographic attributes in order to discharge water volume to the Thai Gulf. 
Moreover, the discharge approaches in Samut Sakorn have applied the potential of tidal waves to flow the water to 
the sea. However, the coordination of Samut Sakorn communities to clear the debris or barricades to water flow is 
just one aspect contributing to the flow of water volume. The drainage system of Samut Sakorn is dependent on the 
canal system, which in turn depends on geographic attributes, rather than coordination.
In the case of flood management in Samut Sakorn Municipality, municipal officers and the provincial sector tried to 
monitor and evaluate the situation. Samut Sakorn was expected to become flooded in the flood of 2011 due to its 
geographical attributes; thus, the first priority of the municipality in flood response in Samut Sakorn Municipality is 
to discharge the water to the Gulf of Thailand as fast as possible. The response efforts provide by Samut Sakorn 
Fig.13　Location of Samut Sakorn Municipality, Samut Sakorn Province
Source: Google Earth, 2013
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Municipality and the Samut Sakorn Provincial office are based on machinery. The National Municipality League of 
Thailand also gives support to municipality as a third party by contacting flood-unaffected municipalities to gives 
some flood protection equipment, relief materials and manpower.
Due to the large amount of flooding widespread throughout many provinces, water flowed through Khlong 
Mahasawwad Canal, Khlong Pasi Charoen Canal, Borommarachonnanee Road, Petch Kasem Road, Jom Thong Road, 
and Akechai Road. These path leads to Phara Rama II Road and approach Samut Sakorn Province. Historically, 
Samut Sakorn had a numbers of canals, which could drain the amount of water practically; when the water 
approaches, as it does annually, this canal system could handle the large amount of water discharge, so the effect 
from flooding in the upper streams did not affect Samut Sakorn severely, unlike other flood-afflicted provinces. In 
2011, Samut Sakorn had to respond to the flood discharge caused by the changing of land use and disappearance of 
the canal system, especially the urban development of Amphoe Mueng and Amphoe Kratum Ban, Samut Sakorn 
Province. Moreover, the Tha Chin River, which is considered a major river to discharge water from upper stream to 
the Gulf of Thailand, was chosen to flow the water in order to alleviate the large amount of water from the Chao 
Phraya River. Although the local authorities had well-prepared flood protection such as flood protection gates and 
canals, the inaccurate information provided by the government, such as when and how the water would approach the 
municipality, led to improper flood management. Especially in the west part of Bangkok, even though it has canals, 
there are no vertical lines of canals which could distribute the amount of water to another section of horizontally-laid 
canals. Consequently, the discharge of water was likely to create conflicts between communities, especially in the 
case of communities which did not want to become flooded, but were needed in order to discharge the large amount 
of water more rapidly and lower the duration of flood in the region. Samut Sakorn residents were delegated to 
discharge a large amount of water from the upper stream into the Gulf of Thailand through their own efforts such as 
surveying and destroying some flood barricades such as garbage and water plants. This effort shows an effective 
collaboration in flood mitigation and response; however, municipal officers have to contact people and communities 
which have different attitudes to flood management and have not received proper support from the government. 
Otherwise, Samut Sakorn might be afflicted by flooding in the future. Although Samut Sakorn was not declared a 
model of flood management, the past attitude of people who live individually changed to an attitude of 
collaboration18）. This situation points out the importance of community leaders, administrative organizations, the 
business sector, the industrial sectors, and individual people. The effort of flood discharge was initiated and enacted 
by the people of Samut Sakorn, without support from the government. As usual, even though there was collaboration 
within the municipality, coordination with nearby jurisdictions proved very difficult to maintain or even initiate; thus, 
third parties and organizations are required to negotiate and resolve the conflicts.
Ⅴ．Conclusion and discussion
Thailand experiences annual flooding regardless of its geographic conditions, since the urban area expanded to 
suburbs and rural areas through unplanned urban expansion, and because of deforestation which leads to severe 
flooding, especially in the downstream area of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. Crucially, there are four major 
reasons for the unusual circumstances of this flood situation. They are: (1) Natural causes (e.g., tropical storms); (2) 
Failure of dam management; (3) Ill-prepared flood mitigation, such as unplanned urban expansion, deforestation, and 
canal settlements; and (4) Political issues, which become more sensitive due to the discontinuity of management 
governed by different governments. However, the topic of flood occurrence is still not answered clearly.
Since the ineffectiveness of response by the central government was revealed, municipalities, communities, and the 
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private sector have tried to protect their land and assets by collaborating with each other in order to survive 
together. Precisely, the collaboration between communities and municipalities in the flood situation reveal the sense 
of Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) which is an important factor in reducing their 
vulnerability and enhancing their capacities (ADPC 2003). There are nine elements of the bottom-up approach 
towards the concept of CBDRM, which are: (1) The capability of local people in initiating and sustaining their own 
community development; (2) Local leadership; (3) Broad-based local participation in comprehensive planning; (4) 
Education opportunities; (5) The improved utilization of local resources; (6) Responsible utilization of outside financial 
support; (7) Local initiative continuity; (8) The realization that responsibility for change rests with community 
members; and (9) Variation of perceptions of risks among community members and groups in community (ADPC, 
2006). This flood case motivated communities to take concern for flood response and made them realize that they 
should do something to tackle an unsecure situation, rather than wait for relief by the government. These 
circumstances showed the possibility of local self relief in a flood situation. Moreover, the approach of Incident 
Command System also encourages the importance of local administration towards flood management, which is 
related to the concept of the bottom-up approach. However, it really depends on the local resources and the severity 
of the disaster. If the severity of the disaster could be considered as an uncontrollable, then the effectiveness of 
Incident Command System on the local level, in this case the municipalities and the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration, depends on local resources such as equipment, budgets, and teamwork among municipal offices and 
community members.
Municipalities also changed their strategy of response towards flood disasters, instead collaborating with 
community members and community organizations as co-workers. Even though those areas were afflicted by 
flooding, the municipalities were not seen as the main subject being blamed due to unsuccessful flood protection. The 
central government was the subject being blamed by local people, especially those who live in flood-afflicted areas. 
Moreover, since the questions relate to transparency of relief distribution, double-standards, and slowness in response 
from the central government, these responsibilities are laid at the doorstep of the central government.
Conflicts on the local level between community members and municipalities with regard to flood management also 
occurred, even though there was collaboration among various stakeholders. To reduce these conflicts, political-free 
actors are necessary to fill the role of negotiator. Though they can come from any kinds of groups or have any 
particular interests, mostly they belong to Buddhism, and monks are individuals who people respect; as a result, 
monks become suitable negotiators in conflict resolution. Monk could involve in flood conflict resolution as negotiator 
because most of Thai people are respect in Buddhism, any violation to monk or any violent action in temple are 
considered as a sinful in Thai Society. These circumstances showed the necessity of third parties in flood 
management, especially in the case of conflict resolution. During the flood situation of 2011, conflict resolution towards 
flood response was resolved by confrontation, and sometimes through intervention by authorities (Thailand Research 
Fund, 2012). Because this flood situation afflicted a wide-scale area, relevant authority groups were the police and 
municipal officers. However, other groups such as academic and institutional groups, as well as non-profit 
organizations, participated in conflict resolution by providing a public hearing, which created a sense of negotiation 
and found suitable solutions in long-term approach and comprehensive flood management. Thus, the measures to 
resolve conflict in flood management depends on the situation: negotiation and finding common agreement is suitable 
in a non-disaster period, unlike a disaster period, when confrontation and intervention might be useful. This research 
reveal the important of third-parties towards flood conflict management, for each role of third-parties towards flood 
response and flood conflict resolution are depends on their function, legislation, manpower, resources and roles in 
society.
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Although the potential for collaboration has been underlined as an important factor in disaster management 
activities, in disaster response it seems that it is the common goal of all kinds of respondents and stakeholders to pull 
in the same direction. This study focuses on the collaboration during disaster response, but in order to improve the 
stability of collaboration between municipalities and communities, long-term collaboration is necessary for the success 
of community-based disaster management. This flood situation revealed the importance of flood conflict management 
among stakeholders in flood response, to minimize those conflicts, various approaches such as risk communication, 
public involvement in the planning process, capacity buildings, and increasing social cohesion become crucial aspects 
in an urban resilience approach and achieve sustainable development.
Notes
1 ）Doctoral student of Graduate school of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University, E-mail: rinarch-121@hotmail.com
2 ）Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) is the operation plan which adopts the concept of Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). 
The SNAP operation plan was implemented at the beginning of 2010 and proposed to end in the year of 2019.
3 ）Definition of Safety culture had stated in 1988 after the Chernobyl disaster. As the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, 
an organization’s health and safety management (Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installation, 1993:23, Antonsen, 
2009:16) Safety culture also being as a way of ensuring high levels of safety performance in organizations, which in contrast to the 
systematic engineered management of hazards and effects (Hudson, 1999)
4 ）Thaiwater.net, 2013, The documentary of Thailand flooding in 2011 [In Thai] available at http://www.thaiwater.net/current/
menu.html
5 ）Economic damage could described into two aspects, economic ‘damage’ is refers to direct impacts on physical assets, products, 
raw materials, machinery and properties; economic ‘loss’ is refers to reduced or loss of production opportunities (GFDRR; Global 
Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery)
6 ）Suan Dusit Poll, 2011, Perception towards Flooding in Thailand and Politics in 2011, by Sukhum Chaloeisap
7 ）Academic Network for Community Happiness Observation and Research, ANCHOR, 2011, Feedback from afflicted people 
towards relief organs in 2011, by Noppadol Kannika
8 ）Assistance Professor Dr., Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University
9 ）Cultural openness refers to individual perspectives and institutional perspectives. There are main aspects of cultural openness 
are (1) Transparency; value and process. (2) Awareness; identification of relevant cultural aspects and reflectivity. And (3) 
Reliability; trust and responsibility (Leichsenring et. Al., p.7)
10）King Prajadhipok’ Institute, 2012, Roles and Responsibility of Public Administrative Organization towards Strategic Disaster 
Management Issues, Seminar, 13th–14th March, 2012.
11）Assistant Professor Dr., Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and Director of Local Government King 
Prajadhipok’s Institute
12）Thailand Research Fund (TRF), 2012, The Voice and Vulnerability: Political Debate in Flood Situation in 2011
13）Ibid., 2012
14）Prof. Dr., Division of Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University
15）Ibid., 2012
16）Associate Professor Dr., Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidol University
17）Kom Chut Luk News, 2011, Pak Kret Model, the collaboration between Municipality, Temple and household, News [In Thai]
18）OK Nation Blog, 15th November 2011, Samut Sakorn dedicate in flood discharge, The prototype of the last province in flood 
management [In Thai]
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